We introduce a simple elicitation process where subject-matter experts provide only ordinal judgments of the attractiveness of potential targets, and the adversary utility of each target is assumed to involve multiple attributes. Probability distributions over the various attribute weights are then mathematically derived (using either probabilistic inversion or Bayesian density estimation). This elicitation process reduces the burden of time-consuming orientation and training in traditional methods of attribute weight elicitation, and explicitly captures the existing uncertainty and disagreement among experts, rather than attempts to achieve consensus by eliminating them. We identify the relationship between the two methods and conduct sensitivity analysis to elucidate how these methods handle expert consensus or disagreement. We also present a real-world application on elicitation of adversarial preferences over various attack scenarios to show the applicability of our proposed methods.
Introduction
Many adversarial decision-making problems, based on either probabilistic risk assessment or game-theoretic models, require the quantification of adversary objectives. This is a difficult task for numerous reasons. First of all, terrorist attacks (at least those of greatest concern) have occurred relatively rarely, and pure statistical analysis of this issue is far from ready for use in practice. Some exploratory work exists, including Enders and Sandler (2000) , Barros and Proença (2005) , and Mohtadi and Murshid (2009) , but none of these studies explicitly attempts to use historical data to quantify adversary utility functions. It is therefore necessary to turn to subject-matter experts (e.g., intelligence experts, policy makers, security observers, and etc.) for such inputs.
However, many intelligence experts are not quantitatively trained and may be reluctant to express their knowledge in probabilistic form. Furthermore, they often place great weight on achieving consensus, which is not conducive to accurately characterizing the level of uncertainty that may exist. As a result, risk analysts sometimes have unrealistic expectations concerning the ability and willingness of intelligence experts to provide quantitative risk estimates (Baker et al. 2009 ). The objective of this paper is to bridge this gap by providing a simple expert-elicitation process in which intelligence experts are asked to give only ordinal judgments (e.g., to rank the attractiveness of selected potential targets or attack strategies), but these ordinal rankings can be used to mathematically derive cardinal estimates for modeling adversary preferences.
An adversary's objective could be a univariate function, such as maximizing the dollar-equivalent damage from an attack (e.g., Abhichandani 2003, Bier et al. 2005) . However, there is reason to believe that more complex multivariate measures of target attractiveness will be more realistic (Paté-Cornell and Guikema 2002 , Beitel et al. 2004 , Rosoff and John 2009 , Bier et al. 2013 , taking into account both the resources required for an attack, and the return on those investments (e.g., fatalities, property damage, and the symbolic values of the targets). One crucial elicitation task is then to use expert judgments to derive estimates for the various adversary attribute weights.
In this paper, we focus on two mathematical methods that can infer probability distributions over the various adversary attribute weights from the experts' ordinal judgments: probabilistic inversion (Cooke 1994 , Bedford and Cooke 2001 , Kraan and Bedford 2005 , Kurowicka et al. 2010 , Neslo et al. 2011 ; and Bayesian density estimation (Ferguson 1973 (Ferguson , 1974 (Ferguson , 1983 Escobar and West 1995) . In particular, we extend the work on probabilistic inversion by Neslo et al. to include an unobserved attribute that is not known to the defender but may be important to the adversary, which solves the infeasibility problem encountered in many previous applications of probabilistic inversion.
We also extend Bayesian density estimation to the case of ordinal data in a rigorous manner. Erkanli et al. (1993) apply Bayesian density estimation to estimation using ordinal inputs. However, they first convert the rank orderings to cardinal values (a process that may introduce additional information and biases), and then treat those cardinal values as if they were independent (even though in fact they cannot be, since the underlying ordinal rankings are of course not independent). By contrast, our use of Bayesian density estimation avoids these pitfalls by treating the entire set of rank orderings from a given expert as a single observation (thus inherently accounting for the lack of independence of rank orderings), and using the rank orderings directly (rather than converting them into cardinal values first).
Although the motivation for our work was the need for methods of estimating adversary preferences from ordinal data, our work also makes methodological contributions to the field of expert elicitation in general, especially through the use of unobserved attributes to ensure the feasibility of probabilistic inversion, and by elucidating the relationship between probabilistic inversion and Bayesian density estimation. Moreover, our work can also be applied to other multiattribute decision-making problems, e.g., as an alternative to conjoint analysis in marketing, which is widely used to quantify how customers value different product features based on their ordinal preferences over products (Shocker and Srinivasan 1979, Green and Srinivasan 1990) .
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We first review the literature on elicitation of attribute weights in §2, and provide some background on the two methods explored in this paper. We then introduce our basic model in §3, and discuss the use of probabilistic inversion (PI) and Bayesian density estimation (BDE) to elicit adversary preferences using ordinal judgments in § §4 and 5, respectively, followed by a discussion of the relationship between the two methods in §6. We also present a real-world application of PI to elicitation of adversarial preferences in §7. Then, §8 exhibits how PI and BDE handle unobserved attributes. We provide sensitivity analysis on how PI and BDE behave in the face of expert consensus or disagreement in §9. Finally, §10 concludes the paper and describes some directions for future work.
Literature Review
Traditional methods for direct elicitation of the various attribute weights in decision analysis include the ratio method (Edwards 1977) , the swing-weighting method (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986) , and the trade-off and pricing-out methods (Keeney and Raiffa 1976) . However, as noted by Edwards (1977) , direct elicitation methods are often expensive and time consuming. Moreover, assessing uncertainty over the attribute weights would require the estimation of subjective probability distributions. Although this approach has a long history of successful application (Edwards 1961 , Cooke 1991 , Hora and Jensen 2002 , it generally requires extensive training and orientation, especially for elicitees with relatively nonquantitative backgrounds (Rosoff and John 2009).
Providing rankings rather than precise cardinal assessments is widely believed to be easier and more reliable (see, for example, Eckenrode 1965) . Therefore, Edwards and Barron (1994) developed a simple rank-based weighting scheme, SMARTER, to reduce the elicitation burden by asking for only rank orderings of the attribute weights. This method has been found to perform reasonably well in a wide variety of cases (Barron and Barrett 1996) , but yields only point estimates of attribute weights. A related method by Abbas (2004 Abbas ( , 2006 uses maximum entropy to convert rank orderings of alternatives into utility assessments, but does not provide explicit estimates of attribute weights, and therefore cannot be applied to additional alternatives that have not been ranked.
Conjoint analysis in marketing is another example of a method that asks respondents only for ordinal judgments. Here, surveyed customers compare products in a factorial design; logistic regression is then used to estimate the relative importance of each product attribute (Shocker and Srinivasan 1979, Green and Srinivasan 1990) . Similarly, contingent valuation has been used for eliciting public opinion about nonmarket items, such as environmental goods. This method typically asks dichotomous questions, such as "Are you willing to pay $X to keep the status quo unchanged?" and uses logistic regression to estimate the relative importance of various environmental attributes (Hanemann 1984 , McFadden 1994 . Unfortunately, like SMARTER, the above ranking-based elicitation methods yield only point estimates for the attribute weights. Mixed-logit models have been developed to incorporate uncertainty into conjoint analysis, but such models generally assume that the covariate coefficients (i.e., attribute weights) follow the normal distribution (Revelt and Train 1998 , McFadden and Train 2000 , Sándor and Wedel 2002 .
In this paper, we investigate two methods, probabilistic inversion and Bayesian density estimation, to generate probability distributions over the attribute weights instead of just point estimates, but without distributional assumptions such as normality.
The goal of probabilistic inversion is to find a probability distribution over the input quantities of interest (e.g., attribute weights, in our case) that can reproduce the stated (theoretical or empirical) marginal distributions over the model outputs (e.g., experts' rank orderings of target attractiveness); see Cooke (1994) , and Kraan and Bedford (2005) . The idea of using probabilistic inversion to elicit attribute weights from ordinal judgments comes from Neslo et al. (2011) . However, because Neslo et al. do not include unobserved attributes in their model, their approach frequently yields no feasible solution, suggesting that the available set of attribute(s) is not adequate to explain the given expert judgments. By contrast, we explicitly account for any unobserved attributes, which should in theory make it possible to obtain a perfect match between the distribution over uncertain adversary preferences and the empirical distribution of expert rankings. Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 .17] on 14 August 2015, at 11:59 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
It is worth noting that the logic of probabilistic inversion is analogous to earlier work by Kadane et al. (1980) , who elicited subjective conjugate distributions for the covariate coefficients in a multiple linear regression model using quantile estimates of the response variable. However, we believe that probabilistic inversion can be applied to a broader range of problems, because it does not require the use of conjugate priors.
Bayesian density estimation (Ferguson 1973 (Ferguson , 1974 ) allows the decision maker (e.g., the defender, in our case) to assign prior probability distributions to the quantities of interest, and use observations of these quantities to update the prior distributions. In addition, the defender can also specify a degree of reliance on his or her own judgment, with higher reliance on the defender's prior knowledge corresponding to less trust in the data (i.e., expert judgments). Unlike in traditional Bayesian density estimation (e.g., Ferguson 1983, Escobar and West 1995) , however, our data consist of expert rank orderings, so a particular rank ordering corresponds not to a single point in the parameter space, but rather to a truncated region of it. Note also that the posterior distributions in our case are often too complicated to be expressed in closed form, but can be easily simulated using Gibbs sampling (Geman and Geman 1984, Gelfand et al. 1992 ).
Basic Model
In this paper, we assume that the adversary's target valuations are represented by a multiattribute utility function, which may in particular include unobserved attributes that are important to the adversary, but have not been identified by the defender (Jenelius et al. 2010, Wang and Bier 2011) . For simplicity, we assume that the adversary's utility is linear in each of the various attributes, and these attributes are additively independent of each other. In particular, the adversary's target valuation U n for a particular target n (n = 1 N ) is given by 
, are assumed to be uncertain (as they will be to the defender). We use lower-case letters w and y for realizations of the vector random variables W and Y , respectively. Note that the Y n are introduced to represent the effects of any additional attributes that are unobserved by the defender, but could nonetheless be important to the adversary. There may of course be dependence among the Y n . However, because we generally do not know what the unobserved attributes are, we assume a priori that the Y n are independent and identically distributed.
Let be the space of all possible values of (W , Y ), as given by
where M 1 is the simplex defined by w ∈ M + M m=1 w m = 1 . The task of expert elicitation is then to mathematically derive probability distributions over that can match the rank orderings of target valuations U n provided by the experts.
Note that the linear-additive form in (1) is often adopted as a reasonable approximation of the true preference function; see, for example, Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) . In fact, our methods can also be extended in a straightforward way to accommodate multilinear utility functions (Keeney and Raiffa 1976) . However, they are not directly applicable to more complex preference structures such as utility dependence (e.g., Keeney and Raiffa 1976, Abbas and Bell 2011) .
Probabilistic Inversion
In this section, we first formalize the method used by Neslo et al. (2011) to convert ordinal judgments into cardinal estimates using probabilistic inversion (PI), and extend that method to include unobserved attributes that are not known to the defender, but may be important to the adversary. We then present a Monte Carlo-based approximation of the PI problem, and present two possible solution approaches to solving it.
Mathematical Basis of PI
Suppose that we ask K experts to rank the top R out of N targets based on their attractiveness to the adversary, no ties of targets being allowed. Note that when R = N , experts are asked to give a complete rank ordering of all targets. (The methods presented in this paper can be extended in a straightforward manner to the case where the experts also provide rankings for some number R of the least attractive targets.) We then specify an R-by-N empirical distribution matrix of expert rankings, P , where element P rn represents the probability that target n is ranked at the rth place by a randomly chosen one of the K experts (as in Neslo et al. 2011) . For example, suppose that three experts are asked to compare two targets. One of these experts thinks that target 1 is more attractive to the adversary, whereas the other two experts both think that target 2 is more attractive. In this case, the empirical distribution matrix for the three experts is P = 1/3 2/3 2/3 1/3 . Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 .17] on 14 August 2015, at 11:59 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
Note that because ties are not allowed, each expert can rank exactly one target in the rth place, so the row sums of P satisfy N n=1 P rn = 1 for all r = 1 R. To illustrate the PI approach, we consider the uncertain adversary parameters (W Y ) as "input," and treat the expert rank orderings as an "output" that depends on the values of (W Y ). PI aims to find the distribution Q over , the space of all possible values of (W Y ), that can match the empirical distribution matrix of expert rankings P , and has the smallest Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence to a predetermined (e.g., noninformative) starting probability measure, Q 0 . The use of K-L divergence to measure the closeness of two probability distributions in PI is recommended by Cooke (1994) . In particular, the optimization problem is given by
where J w y is an R-by-N indicator matrix. For a given set of attribute weights w and utilities y of the unobserved attribute, J rn w y equals 1 if target n ranks in the rth place and 0 otherwise. In addition, dQ/dQ 0 is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the probability measure Q with respect to the starting measure Q 0 (Seppäläinen 2010) . Note that to have finite K-L divergence in (3), we must assume that Q is absolutely continuous with respect to Q 0 . Moreover, we use the convention that if dQ/dQ 0 = 0, then dQ/dQ 0 ln dQ/dQ 0 dQ 0 = 0, following Csiszár (1975) . We could choose the starting measure Q 0 to be noninformative if the defender had little or no prior knowledge about the adversary preferences before any expert judgment became available. An easy choice for Q 0 in that case would be to adopt a "flat" starting measure, i.e., to assign equal probability to every possible value in the adversary parameter space . In particular, the attribute weights W would be assumed to follow the Dirichlet distribution with all parameters equal to 1; moreover, the utilities of the unobserved attribute for the various targets Y would be independently uniformly distributed in 0 1 , and also independent of the attribute weights W . If desired, of course, we could also consider other types of noninformative starting measures (e.g., U -shaped instead of uniform), or an informative starting measure.
Monte Carlo-Based Approximation
The probability distribution Q * that solves Equation (3), which is a convex optimization problem, has density satisfying
where the rn are Lagrange multipliers for the constraints in (3), and c is a normalizing constant. However, it is difficult to obtain the Lagrange multipliers rn analytically in the important case of multiple experts. Therefore, we instead resort to Monte Carlo simulation. In particular, we randomly generate S independent samples for the adversary parameters (W Y ) from the starting measure Q 0 , and let¯ be the set of all simulated values (w s , y s ), s = 1 S. We construct the discretized starting measureQ 0 by placing equal mass on every element (w s , y s ) of¯ . The approximate PI problem is then to find a discrete distribution q = q 1 q S ) over the elements of¯ that yields the smallest K-L divergence from the discretized starting measureQ 0 , given that the mapping of q to the space of target rank orderings matches the empirical distribution matrix P . In particular, the approximated PI problem is given by
where S 1 is the simplex defined by q ∈ S + S s=1 · q s = 1 . Proposition 1 provides a sufficient condition to guarantee the feasibility of the approximate PI problem in (5). Proposition 1. Suppose that a set of independent random samples w s y s , s = 1 S, has been drawn from the starting measure Q 0 . If for each expert, ∃ s such that w s y s yields the rank ordering of targets specified by that expert, then the optimization program in (5) is feasible and has a unique optimal solution.
Proof. See the online appendix (available as supplemental material at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2013.1159).
When the approximate PI problem in (5) is feasible, we may employ the iterative proportional fitting (IPF; Csiszár 1975), which is a general algorithm to find the smallest K-L divergence between two discrete probability measures subject to linear constraints. In particular, the procedure begins with q s = 1/S for s = 1 S, and iteratively adjusts q to satisfy exactly one of the linear equations in (5) at a time. If we have a sufficiently large number of samples S, then for each expert, we are ensured to have at least one sample (w s y s ) that can match that expert's rank ordering of targets. However, when it takes too many samples to ensure the feasibility of (5) (e.g., for large numbers of targets), we could also use the iterative PARFUM algorithm developed by Du et al. (2006) to get a probability distribution for (W Y ) corresponding to a marginal ranking distribution that is "close" to the empirical expert ranking matrix P . Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 .17] on 14 August 2015, at 11:59 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
Bayesian Density Estimation
We now discuss another elicitation method, Bayesian density estimation (BDE). First, we explain how BDE can be applied to our elicitation process. We then describe how Gibbs sampling could be used to obtain the (expected) posterior distribution over the parameters of the adversary's utility function, given ordinal judgments of adversary preferences by experts.
Mathematical Basis of BDE
BDE allows the defender to specify a prior distribution Q p over , the space of adversary parameters (W Y ), and then treat expert judgments as observations to update that prior, leading to a posterior distribution Q. In particular, we assume that the defender's prior Q p is chosen in accordance to a Dirichlet process whose expectation is the starting measure Q 0 . This simplifies the Bayesian updating, because the posterior Q will still be a Dirichlet process, but with different parameters. See Ferguson (1973) for the definition of a Dirichlet process. Moreover, the defender can specify a self-trust degree ( > 0) to reflect the level of reliance on his or her own knowledge about the adversary preferences, as opposed to the experts'.
Suppose again that we ask K experts to rank the top R out of N targets; no ties among targets being allowed. We can associate the (partial) rank ordering provided by expert k (k = 1 K) with a subset of by excluding all values of (W Y ) that are inconsistent with that expert's judgment. In particular, we denote the rank ordering of expert k by an ordered set of target indices RO
where n r k is the index of the rth most attractive target according to expert k, and define the active region AR k for expert k as given by
We randomly sample an observation O k ∈ AR k ⊆ under the starting measure Q 0 to represent expert k's rank ordering RO k . We then condition on O k instead of RO k ; in other words, we treat the rank ordering RO k as if it were equivalent to a single random point O k ∈ that generates rank ordering RO k . The distribution Q k 0 for random point O k is therefore proportional to
where 1 w y ∈AR k equals 1 if w y ∈ AR k and 0 oth-
is a truncated version of Q 0 that puts nonzero mass on only those values (w y) that are in the active region AR
k . In what follows, we use the lower-case letter o k to denote a realization of O k .
Suppose that the random observations O k (k = 1 K) for the various experts are independent of each other, and also independent of the prior Dirichlet process Q p . Then the posterior distribution Q conditional on the observations O k (k = 1 K) is a mixture of Dirichlet processes (Antoniak 1974) , as given by
where o k is the probability distribution giving unit mass to the point o k . Moreover, the expectation E Q of the posterior distribution is a weighted sum of probability distributions as given by
In traditional BDE, each of the Q k 0 in (8) would reduce to a unit probability mass at a single point; however, in our application, Q k 0 is instead a truncated version of the starting measure, maintaining nonzero mass over that portion of the domain consistent with the rank orderings given by expert k. Note that larger values of correspond to higher emphasis on the defender's prior guess Q 0 and lower trust in the expert judgments. In particular, one can interpret this as the defender weighting his or her judgment as equivalent to the judgments of some number of experts.
Gibbs Sampling for BDE
Clearly, (8) is a linear pool of K + 1 probability distributions; i.e.,
with probability 1 +K for k = 1 K which can be simulated by drawing random samples from the starting measure Q 0 with probability / + K , and from each of its truncated variants Q k 0 with probability 1/ + K .
Note that for a given vector of utilities y of the unobserved attribute, the active region AR k for expert k is generally a polyhedron of the attribute weights w (and vice versa). Therefore, we propose to use Gibbs sampling, which is simple to implement, and is popular in the field of Bayesian analysis with constrained parameters (Gelfand et al. 1992) .
In Gibbs sampling is shown to produce random samples that converge in distribution to the target joint probability distribution (Tierney 1994) . However, the convergence rate can be slow, and it is not always clear when to stop the procedure in practice. In this paper, we simply predefine a large number of iterations (10 6 ) and remove the first 10% of the samples to get rid of the influence of the starting point.
Relationship Between PI and BDE
In this section, we explore the relationship between PI and BDE when applied to ordinal preference rankings. In particular, PI exploits only marginal rank orderings, whereas BDE captures correlations among the judgments provided by the experts.
Most of our results assume zero weight on the defender's judgment in BDE. Note that this is done only for comparison purposes, because PI does not allow for an equivalent self-trust parameter. However, this does not mean that we would advocate putting zero weight on the defender's judgment in practice.
Hereafter, we choose the starting measure Q 0 to guarantee a feasible solution to (3).
Proposition 2. Assume that the defender's self-trust degree → 0. If there is only one expert, or the experts all give the same rank ordering, then PI and BDE will yield the same probability distributions for all adversary parameters.
Proof. See the online appendix.
However, if the experts give different rank orderings, PI and BDE generally produce different results, even if we assume that the defender's self-trust degree → 0. To investigate this discrepancy, we define the "composition of expert rank orderings" as a vector of the proportion of experts giving each possible (partial or full) rank ordering. For example, if one expert thinks that the top three out of five targets are targets 1, 2, and 3 (in that order), whereas three other experts all rank targets 1, 4, and 5 as the top three (in that order), then the composition of expert rank orderings is 25% for the rank ordering 1 > 2 > 3 > 4 5 and 75% for the rank ordering 1 > 4 > 5 > 2 3 .
It is trivial to see that if multiple compositions of expert rank orderings yield the same empirical distribution matrix P , then PI will give the same results for all such compositions. By contrast, BDE can generate different results for different compositions of expert rank orderings, even when they correspond to the same empirical distribution matrix P . We show this by an example. Example 1. Suppose that two groups of experts are asked to give full rank orderings of three targets described by two known adversary attributes. Assumed attribute values and hypothetical expert rank orderings are given in Tables 1  and 2 , respectively. We assume that the starting measure Q 0 is flat. For comparison purposes, we also let the defender's self-trust degree → 0. Figure 1 presents the resulting probability distributions for the first known attribute weight W 1 for both methods (PI and BDE) and both expert groups (A and B), along with the corresponding mean values. PI gives identical distributions for both groups (as shown in the upper panel of Figure 1 ), because they have identical empirical distribution matrices; i.e., Figure 1 ). Note that the first expert in group B gives a rank ordering of targets that is perfectly consistent with their values on attribute 1, reflecting a high weight on that attribute, and thus resulting in a broader distribution over W 1 for group B than for group A. The following proposition describes the fundamental relationship between PI and BDE.
Proposition 3. Assume that the defender's self-trust degree → 0. Consider all possible compositions of expert rank orderings that can yield the given empirical distribution matrix P . If BDE gives multiple probability distributions for those compositions, then among those BDE distributions, the one that has the smallest K-L divergence from the starting measure Q 0 coincides with the result given by PI using the same Q 0 .
Proof. See the online appendix. Table 2 .
Hypothetical expert rank orderings for Example 1.
Rank ordering Group
Expert of targets BDE essentially just uses a linear opinion pool based on the chosen starting measure to aggregate the probability distributions that are elicited from the individual experts. By contrast, PI is more complicated. If we find every possible composition of expert rank orderings that satisfies the given empirical distribution matrix P (of which there can be infinitely many!) and apply BDE to all of them, then PI will pick the resulting BDE probability distribution that is closest to the chosen starting measure over the adversary parameters (e.g., by choosing the maximum entropy distribution if we adopt a flat starting measure). In Example 1, the distribution for W 1 generated by PI (see the upper panel of Figure 1 ) in fact coincides with the BDE result for a composition that matches the given P , but is different from that of either group A or B, with equal proportions of experts giving all 3! = 6 possible rank orderings of three targets. (In other words, with six experts, BDE and PI will give the same results if each expert gives a different rank ordering.) Thus, we can see that PI exploits only marginal information about target rankings and fails to take into account correlations among subgroups of experts (e.g., if those experts ranking target 1 higher than target 2 may also rank target 3 higher than target 4). By contrast, BDE is able to utilize that correlational information. However, one should note that using more information may not necessarily make BDE perform more sensibly if, for example, the results seem overly sensitive to minor changes in expert rank orderings.
We would ideally like an elicitation method that is sensitive to the absolute amount of information provided by experts. For example, with only a small number of experts, we may want a method that yields a flatter distribution than when a large number of experts is available. Unfortunately, neither PI nor BDE is able to explicitly capture that idea (at least if we set the defender's self-trust degree → 0). However, when applying BDE, the defender could assign a relatively high self-trust degree (i.e., large ) to at least qualitatively account for the lack of reliability in expert judgments when only a small number of experts is available. We use the following example to illustrate this.
Example 2. Suppose that two experts are asked to give rank orderings of targets described by just one known adversary attribute. Suppose also that the elicited densities Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 .17] on 14 August 2015, at 11:59 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. for the known attribute weight (W 1 ) using judgments of the two individual experts are given by Beta(20 2) and Beta(2 20), respectively. Figure 2 then shows the BDE densities under a flat starting measure, considering various levels of self-trust for the defender. As increases, the aggregated probability density places less reliance on the expert judgments and becomes less informative.
The computational complexity of BDE based on Gibbs sampling grows only linearly with the number of experts, the number of targets, and the number of uncertain adversary parameters. Therefore, one advantage of using BDE is that we can always anticipate obtaining a good solution within a controllable time constraint.
As for PI, if the experts do not deviate too much from the available set of known adversary attributes when giving their rank orderings, then the run time will be roughly equal for any number of experts. This favorable feature constitutes an advantage for PI when handling large numbers of experts. However, it sometimes requires too many samples from Q 0 to ensure a perfect match between the expert judgments and the distribution of rankings produced by the PI method. This is especially likely to occur if some expert judgments cannot possibly be explained by the known attributes. This makes the computational behavior of PI somewhat difficult to analyze, because it may vary from case to case.
Real-World Application
We have successfully applied probabilistic inversion to adversary preference elicitation in Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) (2011). In that project, "proxy" experts (graduate students knowledgeable about terrorism, from countries where support for terrorism is relatively common) were asked to rank eight attack scenarios based on their attractiveness to the adversary, where attack scenarios are characterized by seven known attributes plus an unknown attribute. Figure 3 shows how the expected utilities of the various scenarios differ depending on whether a proxy's judgments were elicited using PI, or by direct elicitation using the random utility method of Rosoff and John (2009) . Both methods identified the same three least attractive scenarios (Pneumonic Plague, Dirty Bomb, and Blister Agent) and assigned relatively high utilities to another three scenarios (Chlorine Tank Explosion, Improvised Explosive Device, and Food Contamination). The only discrepancies are in Nerve Agent and Aerosol Anthrax (which were rated high using PI, but much lower using direct elicitation). However, we could take advantage of such discrepancies as input for convergent validation-e.g., by asking the proxy expert whether he puts more credence in his scenario rankings or his assessed attribute weights.
Moreover, the results in CREATE (2011) also suggest that applying PI to partial rather than full rank orderings can give reasonably reliable results. Figure 4 compares the results of PI using the complete set of eight scenario rankings given by one proxy expert, versus only four rankings (the top three most attractive scenarios and the least attractive scenario). The two sets of expected utilities are quite close. If similar results are obtained in more extensive studies, this would support the idea that attribute weights can be estimated by asking experts to rank only a modest subset of alternatives, with no need to rank all alternatives.
Treatment of Unobserved Attributes
The elicited weight for the unobserved attribute (from either PI or BDE) can be used as a measure of how well the given expert judgments can be explained by the assumed adversary attributes. In particular, for a given set of targets and their attribute values, the larger the weight we get for the unobserved attribute, the less capable the known attributes are of matching the expert opinions, and the more we need to investigate the nature of any possible unobserved attributes.
One caveat of our model is that even if the rank orderings of targets are perfectly consistent with their values on the known attributes, we could still get a nonzero weight for the unobserved attribute. Nonetheless, the mean of that weight generally decays as the number of targets N grows, and may become arbitrarily small when N gets sufficiently large. To illustrate this, consider the following example.
Example 3. Suppose that an expert is asked to rank N targets described by just one known adversary attribute, where we assume a flat starting measure. Note that when there is only one expert, PI and BDE will yield the same result (if we set the defender's self-trust degree → 0). We also assume that the target values on the known attribute (a ·1 ) form an arithmetic series with maximum 1 and minimum 0. For example, when we have N = 4 targets, the sorted attribute values are a 11 a 21 a 31 a 41 = 1 2/3 1/3 0 . If the expert gives a rank ordering of targets that is perfectly consistent with their values on the known attribute, then the mean elicited weight E W 2 for the unobserved attribute will be strictly decreasing in the number of targets N (at least for N 1 000). Moreover, E W 2 gets However, it is important to know how quickly the weight for the unobserved attribute declines in practice. To investigate this, we now randomly generate 500 sets of values for the known attribute for each given number of targets N . Figure 5 reports the 90% confidence interval of E W 2 as a function of N , assuming that the expert bases his judgment entirely on the simulated attribute values. As a rule of thumb, we may regard the weight for the unobserved attribute as being negligible in the case of perfect consistency when the number of targets is sufficiently large (e.g., N 15). (Of course, if the rank orderings of target attractiveness provided by experts cannot be well explained by the known adversary attributes, no matter whether the judgments are based on a small or large number of targets, we will get a high weight for the unobserved attribute.)
Note that assigning a moderate weight to the unobserved attribute in the case of perfect consistency for small N may not actually be a flaw of our method. In fact, a given set of known attributes that can well explain the rank orderings of 10 targets should essentially be more reliable than if those same attributes can explain the relative Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 .17] on 14 August 2015, at 11:59 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. attractiveness of only 2 targets. In particular, when there are 2 targets to compare, the known attributes could easily give a perfect match just by coincidence, something that is less likely to happen for larger N . Therefore, the results of our method are conservative in the sense that they avoid placing too much weight on the known attributes when there are only a small number of targets whose rankings are being explained.
Sensitivity Analysis: Expert Consensus and Disagreement
In this section, we conduct sensitivity analysis to explore the behavior of both PI and BDE in the face of expert consensus or disagreement. In particular, we investigate the following questions: (1) If there are different "schools of thought" between experts (i.e., subgroups of experts who hold similar views), do the elicitation methods tend to generate multimodal probability distributions, or do they generate distributions that assign most of their mass in the middle between the different expert views? (2) Do the elicited probability distributions given by these methods adequately reflect the level of consensus or disagreement among the rank orderings given by the experts?
Tendency to Generate Multimodal Distributions
Hypothetically, one might speculate that whether PI and BDE will tend to produce multimodal distributions for the adversary parameters would depend on how far apart the differing expert views are from each other. Moreover, PI and BDE are anticipated to behave most differently when subsets of the ordinal judgments provided by the experts are correlated (e.g., experts ranking target 1 higher than target 2 would also rank target 3 higher than target 4, and vice versa), because in that case, PI will not be able to Consider a case where four experts are asked to rank six targets described by two known adversary attributes (with values of the known attributes given in Table 3 ). This choice of problem scale is complicated enough to illustrate the question of interest reasonably well, and yet is computationally inexpensive. In addition, we choose a flat starting measure for both PI and BDE.
We now randomly simulate expert rank orderings as input for our analysis. We first introduce a set of random variables u kn ranging between 0 and 1 to reflect the utility of target n according to expert k (k = 1 4; n = 1 6), and then derive rank orderings from the randomly generated target utilities u kn . In this way, we can induce a dependency structure among the u kn by adopting the Gaussian copula with desired levels of pairwise correlations (Bier and Yi 1995 , Clemen and Reilly 1999 , Hora 2010 . In particular, we assume that experts 1 and 2 and experts 3 and 4 form two different schools of thought, and set the Pearson correlation coefficients according to cor u 1n u 2n = cor u 3n u 4n = and cor u 1n u 3n = cor u 1n u 4n = cor u 2n u 3n = cor u 2n u 4n = for n = 1 6 where ∈ −1 1 controls the "similarity" of the two differing schools of expert judgments. We also set the Pearson correlation coefficients between the utilities of targets 1 and 3 and targets 2 and 4 for a given expert to both equal ∈ 0 1 ; i.e., cor u k1 u k3 = cor u k2 u k4 = for k = 1 4 where higher means that experts who rank target 1 higher than 2 are likely to rank target 3 higher than 4, and vice versa. We can then construct a valid correlation matrix (i.e., symmetric and positive definite with all diagonal elements equal to 1) for the target utilities u kn that satisfy both of the above conditions (correlations between experts and between targets). For each level of expert similarity and target correlation , we randomly generate 500 sets of values for the u kn and derive the rank orderings accordingly. Applying either PI or BDE, we obtain 500 elicited distributions for the first known attribute weight W 1 , and count the occurrence Figure 6 shows the proportions of multimodal distributions (out of 500) for different choices of and . As we expected, the elicited distributions are more likely to have multiple peaks when the two subgroups of expert judgments are farther apart (corresponding to more negative values of ), using either PI and BDE on a flat starting measure. However, there is a less than 30% chance of multimodal distributions using either PI or BDE, even when the two differing schools of expert views are almost opposite of each other ( = −0 95). Moreover, for a fixed level of expert similarity , more highly correlated rank orderings (corresponding to larger values of ) generally lead to more frequent occurrence of multimodal distributions. This effect is more pronounced for BDE than for PI, as expected. In general, BDE tends to give more multimodal distributions than PI. This tendency is especially significant when target rankings given by each expert are highly correlated (i.e., = 0 95).
Whether we actually want to see a multimodal distribution from elicitation may depend on the problem under investigation. For example, we may prefer multimodal distributions when a large number of experts seem to form differing subgroups (in which similar views are held), because we might be fairly confident that any new expert would then give judgments that fall into some existing school of thought. By contrast, if a small number of experts disagree with each other, we may not want the elicited distributions to be too sensitive to differences between their judgments.
Expert Disagreement and Dispersion of Elicited Distributions
We now discuss another important issue. Ideally, probability distributions provided by a good elicitation method should adequately reflect the level of consensus or disagreement among the rank orderings given by experts. We therefore conduct another Monte Carlo-based sensitivity analysis to explore whether higher levels of disagreement between the experts lead to broader probability distributions for the attribute weights.
In particular, we consider a case where two experts are asked to give full rank orderings to 10 targets described by one known adversary attribute. We assume that the target values on the known attribute (a ·1 ) form an arithmetic series with maximum 1 and minimum 0. Target utilities u kn according to the two experts (k = 1 2; n = 1 10) are then randomly generated, from which rank orderings are derived. Dependency between judgments of the two experts is induced by setting the Pearson correlation coefficients between the target utilities as cor u 1n u 2n = for n = 1 10 where ∈ −1 1 again controls the level of agreement between the two experts. The unrestricted correlations are then properly set to ensure that the correlation matrix for u kn is valid. We use the normalized variance to measure dispersion of the elicited distributions over the adversary attribute weights. Note that the normalized variance for a random variable X ∈ 0 1 is defined as NV X = Var X / E X 1 − E X (Bier and Yi 1995) . In particular, we have Var X E X 1 − E X for X ∈ 0 1 , with equality achieved when E X = 0 or 1, so NV X gives variance as a fraction of its maximum value.
We randomly generate 200 sets of target utilities u kn that satisfy the correlation requirements, with expert rank orderings derived accordingly. This number of simulation runs seems reasonable, because the simulation errors for the quantity of interest (e.g., the normalized variance of the known attribute weight NV W 1 ) are always less than ±5%. Figure 7 shows the average and the 90% confidence Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 .17] on 14 August 2015, at 11:59 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. interval of the normalized variance NV W 1 from both PI and BDE for varying levels of expert similarity , again adopting a flat starting measure. In general, both PI and BDE conform to the predicted trend of generating probability distributions with higher normalized variance for higher levels of disagreement between experts. However, such a trend is less significant when experts strongly disagree with each other (i.e., < 0) than when they give similar judgments (i.e., > 0). In other words, the breadth of the elicited probability distributions does decrease with expert similarity, but is less sensitive to the precise degree of similarity when experts are highly likely to give opposite judgments.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we develop a simple elicitation process to generate probability distributions for uncertain adversary preferences using only rank orderings of target attractiveness provided by experts. To accomplish this task, we discuss two mathematical methods, probabilistic inversion and Bayesian density estimation. One novel feature of our work is the inclusion of unobserved attributes in PI, ensuring the existence of a feasible solution to the inversion problem. Other contributions include the application of BDE to ordinal data in a rigorous manner, and our elucidation of the relationship between PI and BDE.
PI exploits only marginal expert rankings. This feature makes PI suitable to use when expert judgments are less reliable (e.g., when using only a small number of experts representing a much larger population), in which case we may not want to put too much weight on the observed differences between experts. We could also use BDE in that case, by assigning a large weight to the defender's prior knowledge. However, when we wish to explicitly account for correlated rank orderings (e.g., for large numbers of experts), BDE will be more appropriate, because PI is not able to capture such correlations.
The elicitation methods in this paper have been developed based on the assumption that experts give partial (or full) rank orderings of targets without ties. However, in practice, experts may find various targets equally attractive to the adversary, and thus give tied rank orderings for them. Therefore, there is a need to investigate how to allow for ties in expert rank orderings when applying both PI and BDE.
Moreover, experts may disagree on whether a higher value of a particular attribute would make a target more or less attractive to the adversary. This could be accommodated by extending the elicitation methods to allow for negative attribute weights, to take such conflicting expert opinions into account in an automated way.
In other work, we have shown that when the adversary attributes are highly correlated, the elicitation results can be unstable in the face of small changes in the attribute values. Thus, another future task is to study the effect of attribute collinearity or the instability of the elicited quantities. The effect of attribute collinearity here is analogous to that in a multiple regression model; i.e., when predictor variables in a regression model are highly correlated, the regression coefficients may change erratically in response to small changes in the data. Ideally, we hope to develop a type of "significance test" to investigate whether removing a particular attribute will significantly change the relative weights of the remaining attributes (and the importance of the unobserved attribute).
Overall, however, the simplicity and computational ease of our proposed elicitation process make it promising for elicitation problems that involve large numbers of elicitees with nonquantitative backgrounds. For example, the approach might be suitable for use in quantifying customer preferences in marketing, using online surveys. 
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